An Taisce Submission to the Public Consultation on the Climate Action Plan 2026
You can download the full Submission document via this link.
Extract:
QUESTION 1: In Ireland's Greenhouse Gas Emissions Projections 2025-2030, the EPA
now projects for the first time that we are close to meeting our first carbon budget,
following a consistent trend of improving projections for that budget over recent years.
In your view, which policies and measures have been the most successful in reducing
Ireland’s GHG emissions?
First, this consultation on Climate Action Plan 2026 (CAP26) is concluding halfway through Q3, and
the final Plan will likely not be published until year-end. This is wholly unacceptable in our view and
raises serious concerns about the efficacy of CAP26, particularly given the scale of the response
needed to align Ireland with carbon budget obligations.
CAP26 must set out adequate pathways to achieve compliance with the national Climate Act, the EU
Effort Sharing Regulation, and our Paris commitments - previous CAPs have failed. Taking corrective
action to put Ireland on course for budget compliance is a requirement of the CAPs and the basis on
which the annual revisions are to be made.
Before claiming that policies and measures have been successful in reducing Ireland’s emissions, any
analysis needs to provide evidence quantifying policy successes and failures, separating out reasoned
estimates of non-policy effects (e.g., extreme weather, COVID, Ukraine, Iran, EU Nitrates derogation
uncertainty), and assessing the impact of changes to emissions accounting.
First, changes in emissions accounting procedures have been the most influential in ‘reducing’
emissions. The Climate Change Advisory Council (CCAC) based the first two carbon budgets on a
baseline of 68.3Mt CO2eq for 2018. The two budgets had to provide for a reduction of 51% in the
total amount of those emissions by 2030, relative to 2018. Five years at 68.3Mt per year would have
totalled 341.5Mt. The agreed budget was 295Mt, meaning that a total reduction of 46.5Mt was needed
over the period 2021-25.
The recent reassessment of the 2018 baseline by the EPA to 64.5Mt means that the new five-year
total is 322.5Mt. Accordingly the new reduction requirement to comply with the first Carbon Budget
1 (CB1) is now 27.5Mt. This accounting change therefore provides for a ‘windfall’ reduction of
approximately 19Mt. The claim that CB1 has been met thus relies on a major contribution arising
from an accounting change of approximately 19Mt. This means 35-40% of the ‘reductions’ involved
in the CB1 compliance have been achieved through accounting changes rather than policy changes.
Furthermore, the first carbon budget was recommended in 2021 by the CCAC as being reasonably
easy to meet through continued policy, to allow time to ensure the implementation of actions to
deliver the more rapid mitigation needed to achieve Carbon Budget 2 (CB2). Therefore, the claimed
success in meeting CB1 stated in the EPA 2026 Provisional Greenhouse Gas Emissions 1990-2025
report should not be surprising, but it is concerning that some serious caveats to this achievement
are not sufficiently acknowledged:
1. CB1 was likely not in fact met because as-yet-uncounted windthrow (trees downed by wind)
carbon losses from two major storms may result in an exceedance of approximately 5Mt,
which would need to be deducted from CB2.
2. Scientific updates unrelated to climate action achievement have had a large impact (at least
3.75Mt due to the updated 2018 emissions value) in making CB1 easier to meet.
3. Imported electricity is correctly accounted as having zero emissions in production accounting,
but the 'saved' emissions can be estimated by comparison to it being domestic generated
(about 3.6Mt for 2021-25) and the cost of imports can be quantified to give greater context.
The imperative of upholding climate law has never been clearer in the context of clear climate
breakdown effects such as record-breaking heatwaves and wildfires and record sea surface
temperatures. The cost of action not taken now will be felt acutely in the coming years. Climate
breakdown is also a fundamental security issue and would impede competitiveness if not rectified.
CAP26 should therefore be formulated as an emergency plan to instil urgency.
Measures in the previous CAPs are inadequate - Ireland needs a transformative approach. Continuing
incremental change that give privilege to those that are already privileged while leaving many people
behind is rapidly increasing societal polarisation. This approach is dangerous, risky, and fails to
integrate just transition principles. Kicking the can down the road also leaves more work to
subsequent carbon budgets, making the job of compliance even more challenging and much more
socially and economically difficult.
A transformative approach must also address the social and behavioural dimensions of change. An
Taisce’s Environmental Education and Community Action programmes demonstrate the value of
sustained education, community engagement and behaviour change in supporting lasting change.
For example, Green-Schools Travel and Safe Routes to School combine sustained engagement with
targeted infrastructure investment, demonstrating how behaviour change can be reinforced by
changes to the places where people make everyday choices. These approaches should be scaled
alongside the policy, infrastructure and systems changes needed.
QUESTION 2: Among the measures identified in Climate Action Plan 2024 and Climate
Action Plan 2025, which do you consider the highest priority to close the gap to 2030?
Given the rapidly deteriorating ecological health of Ireland, CAP26 requires a completely different
strategy and approach that is much more transformative than previous CAPs. There must be a
transformative scale of investment or else the new CAP will exacerbate climate injustices and
perpetuate social polarisation. Climate action has become a divisive issue because of the narrow,
technology-focused approach taken so far in Ireland. A new approach is urgently needed.
Focusing narrowly on closing the gap to 2030 is not a productive way to frame what is needed. In
the absence of a more transformative climate justice-focused approach that embraces just transition
principles in CAP26, Ireland is likely to face heightened civil unrest and social polarisation. Those most
vulnerable to climate impacts are those who are poor and marginalised. CAP26 has to focus on
investing to improve the lives of those who are most marginalised in society.
That said, none of the measures in CAP24/25 provide a convincing pathway to compliance or evidence
of the correctional changes required in the Climate Act. In particular, the priority must be to reduce
methane emissions in compliance with the Global Methane Pledge obligations entered into by the
State at COP29. The credibility of how much and by what time agricultural emissions are planned to
reduce must remain a very high priority. In addition, the full implementation of the recommendations
of the Land Use Review is an essential component of addressing this priority.
Measures prioritised should deliver emissions reductions by 2030 while building the systems,
communities and behaviours needed for longer-term transformation. Priority should be given to
measures that:
• Deliver measurable emissions reductions by 2030 and can be implemented now;
• Combine systems change with education, supported behaviour change and community
mobilisation;
• Build long-term capacity through infrastructure, services, communities and behaviours; and
• Support a just transition, particularly for communities facing climate impacts, rising costs or
barriers to sustainable alternatives.
This aligns with the results of the CAP24 consultation [1], which highlighted the need for greater
public engagement and education, stronger governance, just transition and a systems-level approach.
While CAP25 places greater emphasis on behavioural research and public attitudes, understanding
behaviour alone does not deliver change; sustained programmes are needed to support people to
act.
Transport illustrates this implementation gap well. The Joint Oireachtas Committee on Transport
projects that the sector will achieve only 42% of its 2030 target even in its best-case scenario, while
identifying insufficient investment in measures that can be delivered without major infrastructure
timelines, including electric buses, school transport and rural bus networks. These measures should
be progressed alongside major projects such as MetroLink and Cork Commuter Rail. Smaller-scale,
locally delivered programmes can also support climate justice by addressing local barriers and
reaching communities that may not benefit immediately from major infrastructure investment.
*Notes (see downloadable document)
QUESTION 3: In the key sectoral areas identified (Electricity, Transport, Industry,
Buildings, Agriculture and Land Use), what additional actions to those already in CAP 24
and CAP 25 could, in your view, accelerate delivery in these areas?
Sectoral mitigation achievement during the first carbon budget (CB) period 2021–2025 has been poor.
As EPA greenhouse gas (GHG) reporting [1] makes clear, due to scientific updates (since 2021) to
the Sectoral Emission Ceilings’ (SECs) 2018 base year emissions, the SECs defined by Government in
the 2022 are no longer meaningful. Therefore, for each sector the clearest measure of achievement
is the 2022 SEC Report’s [2] key table’s approximate target percentage reduction by 2025 relative to
2018. On this basis, compared with the provisional 2025 emissions, only Buildings-Residential
achieved greater mitigation (-24%) than its 2025 target (-20%). Electricity came close to its target,
but this was substantially helped by the zero emissions rating for imported electricity, which supplied
more than 15% of demand over the past two years. All other named CAP sectors fell well short of
their target percentage reductions, the worst being Agriculture (only -5% reduction compared to its
-10% target) and Transport (only -6% reduction compared to its -20% target). Quantification of
LULUCF (Land use, land use change and forestry) emissions for 2024 and 2025 are urgently required
to account for storm windthrow (trees downed by storms), to finalise the extent of compliance, or
otherwise, with Carbon Budget 1.
The preliminary assessment of sectoral mitigation to 2030 is even worse than up to 2025. The SECs
for 2026–2030 are also obsolete due to the scientific updates since 2021; therefore, they require
revision, especially due to the urgent requirement to allocate the ‘unallocated’ total of 26Mt in CB2
among the sectors. The With Existing Measures (WEM) and With Additional Measures (WAM) data in
the EPA 2026 Projections 2025–2030 report indicate major mitigation failure across all sectors
compared to the 2022 SEC document key table’s approximate target percentage reductions by 2030
relative to 2018. Worst of all, Buildings-Commercial/Public are projected to increase emissions by 7%
in 2030 relative to 2018, a gross failure compared to the target 2030 reduction of -35%. Electricity is
projected to achieve at best only a -61% reduction compared to its -75% target. Agriculture may
only achieve a WEM reduction of -4% by 2030 or as much as a WAM reduction of -19%, but both fall
well short of the required -25%. Transport, Buildings-Residential and Industry are projected to only
achieve about a third of their target reductions.
These sectoral assessments starkly reveal governance failure to date. The projections for meeting
the EU Effort Sharing Regulation (including Transport and Agriculture) requirement of a -42%
reduction relative to 2005 are similarly very poor, to date only a -12% reduction has been achieved.
Urgent but equitable measures are required across all sectors to achieve the pathways to the targeted
reductions. A clear timeline for the phase out of fossil fuel use is also required.
Actions in the previous and current CAPs are over-reliant on technological fixes such as unproven
carbon removal technologies while not focusing enough on demand reduction, particularly in sectors
such as electricity and transport.
Electricity
While electricity generation has so far achieved better emission reductions than most sectors, growth
of demand has outpaced energy efficiency gains and renewable energy penetration of the market.
Significant focus on demand management and reduction is needed in CAP26.
Too many of the existing CAP measures rely on significant amounts of renewable electricity coming
on-stream. This is problematic because progress towards renewables targets is being significantly
diluted by the ongoing proliferation of high energy demand developments, in particular data centres.
The higher the total electricity demand, the more renewables capacity is needed. Therefore, as more
energy intensive developments, like data centres, come onstream, less renewable energy is available
for other uses and the actual decarbonisation of the energy system. Indeed, SEAI figures show that
the share of renewables has not increased since 2020, largely due to the impact of data centres. They
state in their 2024 National Energy Projections report: "If the scale and pace of renewable energy
growth cannot exceed that of electricity demand, as was the case in 2023, then renewables are just
abating further increases in emissions rather than delivering the absolute reductions in greenhouse
gas emissions required” [3]. Similarly, research from Dr. Hannah Daly in University College Cork found
that since 2017 the increase in data centre power demand has outstripped all the additional electricity
generated from wind power in Ireland [4].
CAP26 should provide for an independent national review of current and projected data centre energy
demand, focusing on compliance with the legally binding constraints of the carbon budgets. Such a
review should inform a new national policy and regulations on the level of future data centre
development, if any, that can be accommodated while achieving compliance with our national,
European and international emissions reduction obligations. This is of particular importance given the
proliferation of AI use and its impacts on the emissions. A moratorium on all further data centre
development, not just in currently grid-constrained areas, should be put in place until such a policy
is enacted. The moratorium would need to be continued if the review finds that data centre
development cannot be accommodated within the constraints of our legally binding carbon budgets.
Similarly, the practice of data centres using on-site gas-fired generation, ostensibly to relieve pressure
on the electricity grid, represents a medium term commitment to fossil fuel emissions that is not compatible with Ireland’s climate obligations. No further permissions should be granted for data
centres to establish fossil fuel powered generating systems in support of their activities.
We would also highlight an issue with the 2GW threshold for back-up gas-fired electricity generation
as articulated in CAP24 and 25, which has failed to specify a maximum limit. This has resulted in an
abundance of back-up gas plant permits and proposals without a national-level assessment of the
extent to which the 2GW target has been reached. Assessments done as part of planning applications
for gas-fired power plants indicate that between built, under-construction and permitted proposals,
the 2GW target has been well exceeded. Failure to specify a maximum threshold potentially
exacerbates fossil gas lock-in and has allowed for more gas plants to become operational than is
needed for back-up purposes. CAP26 must rectify this issue to impose a limit on further gas
dependency. Justification for continued proliferation of these plants, which rely on uncertain
biomethane and hydrogen transitions, cannot be relied upon to ensure decarbonisation. Furthermore,
demand management considerations must be to the fore given the potential for additional demand
from large energy users such as data centres to be used as justification for continued gas dependency.
Transport
Transport requires a stronger focus on reducing car dependency and making walking, cycling and
public transport safer, more affordable and viable. The Joint Oireachtas Committee on Transport’s
projection that transport will achieve only 42% of its 2030 target even under the best-case scenario
underlines the need to accelerate measures that can deliver change without waiting for major
infrastructure projects.
Successive CAPs have excessively focused on electric vehicles, which exacerbates lock-in to private
car use and all of the negative externalities created by them (congestion in built-up areas, demand
for car parking spaces, road traffic casualties, material resource requirements, further pressures
on/costs associated with roads policing). Fleet electrification and biofuels are heralded as the main
means towards emissions abatement for transport in the medium-term. This downplays the need for
significant further investment in modal shifts towards active travel as well as increased public
transport - particularly in the context of an inflationary economic environment. CAPs thus far have
failed to address these as urgent emissions mitigation measures going into the second and third
Carbon Budget periods.
We therefore recommend the following as focus areas for CAP26:
• Reduce unnecessary car journeys: Give greater weight to planning, parking and other
measures that reduce car dependency, alongside investment in viable alternatives.
Electrification should prioritise high-mileage fleets such as buses, taxis and school transport
where it can deliver the greatest emissions reductions.
• Accelerate walking and cycling infrastructure: Increase investment in connected
footpaths and cycleways, supporting more local and daily journeys by walking and cycling. In
urban areas in particular, road space reallocation to active travel and public transport,
alongside measures such as low-emission zones and workplace parking policies where
appropriate.
• Build public understanding and support: Use sustained public engagement to
demonstrate practical alternatives and involve communities in shaping local transport
solutions.
• Make journeys to school safer: Extend lower speed limits around schools and
systematically include school perimeters in local speed-limit reviews. Speed was the most
frequently raised concern in 158 Green-Schools Walkability Audits conducted in 2025.
• Improve public and school transport, particularly in rural areas: Improve the
integration, availability and affordability of regional bus, Local Link and school transport,
including more efficient route planning and reduced or removed school transport fees. Rural
Green-Schools Travel schools recorded only a 1.5% shift away from car use between 2023–
25, compared with 5.1% in urban schools.
• Tackle transport emissions from tourism: CAP26 should recognise and address the
carbon emissions generated by the tourism sector while being mindful of the benefits of
sustainable tourism to rural communities. Fiscal measures, e.g taxation of heavy private vehicles, are also needed, as are specific targets for reduction in vehicle kilometres and fuel usage.
We would also highlight that aviation and shipping emissions are still left out of the carbon budgets
and the SECs. Despite the fact that Dublin Airport can be considered the greatest individual emitter
of CO2 in the State [5], no significant mitigation measures (other than those imposed internationally)
are proposed for the aviation sector.
In fact, the Government recently fast-tracked the Dublin Airport
(Passenger Cap) Bill which will lead to airport expansion, with associated emissions increases. It is
unacceptable that this major emitter should be encouraged to expand its emissions while controls are
tightened on transport emissions elsewhere. It is essential that emissions reduction targets are
indicated for the aviation and marine sector to chart their progress towards decarbonisation. We
would also note that the development and use of sustainable aviation fuels (SAFs) has been included
in previous CAPs, despite the fact that aviation emissions are not included in the carbon budgets. The
development of effective SAFs is highly uncertain and highly unlikely to occur within envisaged
timeframes.
Built Environment and Industry
In the Built Environment sector, we would seek a continued focus on micro-generation to achieve the
target of 1.6 GW of installed micro-generation capacity (approx. 50kW) by 2030, as set out in CAP24.
This can be driven by continued and enhanced supports for rooftop solar PV, targeting the worstperforming households first and ensuring that solar energy is installed on all new and existing buildings by 2030, as required under Article 10 of the Energy Performance of Buildings Directive (EPBD) (EU/2024/1275).
Currently, the model of rooftop solar PV deployment favours the higher
income demographic, requiring more targeted measures for social housing and rental
accommodation. An opportunity also exists to leverage plug-in solar options for households which are
already being widely deployed in Germany. Furthermore, a revival of SEAI grants for battery systems
for households is urgently required to allow for storage of excess electricity, which would assist in
alleviating energy poverty in the context of a fuel price crisis.
We would also highlight that at the time of writing the Irish Government has yet to transpose the
EPBD, a key legislative tool for calculation of life cycle Global Warming Potential (GWP) of new
buildings, and produce a draft National Building Renovation Plan. This would offer a clearer pathway
for achieving built environment decarbonisation. The government’s failure to transpose the Directive
and produce the required plan potentially indicates an absence of political will regarding building
decarbonisation which is unacceptable in the context of worsening climate breakdown and the major
contribution of the built environment to Ireland’s emissions profile (approximately 37% of the national
total according to the Irish Green Building Council).
A key issue is the absence to date of embodied carbon in national climate policy where the EPBD sets
a zero emissions standard for new buildings and the calculation of whole-life-cycle carbon for new
buildings, including embodied carbon. When embodied emissions are considered in combination with
operational building emissions, the emissions profile of the built environment increases substantially.
Furthermore, key research anticipates that measures to tackle operational emissions via retrofit
programmes and electricity decarbonisation will be offset by growth in embodied emissions, a matter
neglected in CAPs so far [6]. Therefore, CAP26 needs to be explicit in recognising and articulating
measures to achieve a major reduction in the embodied emissions of building materials used for
residential construction in light of ambitious housing targets, which could be assisted by targeting the
widespread suite of vacant/derelict building stock across the country, for example.
The CCAC 2026 Annual Review of the Built Environment provides the following recommendations
regarding Built Environment decarbonisation which should also be implemented without delay:
• Ring-fencing of the carbon tax to support vulnerable households to transition away from costly
fossil fuels for home heating;
• Publication of the National Building Renovation Plan (NBRP) urgently, including a plan to phase
out fossil fuel boilers by 2040 or sooner, as required by the EPBD;
• Sustained and increased funding for retrofitting of social housing via Budget 2027; review and
improvement of existing retrofitting schemes; and
• In the NBRP, the integration of resilience into building renovations, including flood protection,
water use efficiency and improved thermal regulation measures.
Agriculture and Land Use
The CCAC carbon budget recommendations (in 2021 and 2024) consistently require the deepest
possible agricultural methane mitigation, achieving of the order of 25% to 30% methane reduction
by 2030, which would also be in line with Ireland’s commitment to the Global Methane Pledge. Up to
the end of 2025, agricultural methane has only been cut by -4%. Teagasc’s WAM projections depend
on extremely high voluntary uptake of costly feed additives to limit methane emissions that may or
may not be effective. Instead, Teagasc has focused on N2O reduction, -11% up to 2025, via protected
urea use, but this focus fails to understand that methane mitigation is more urgent in meeting
Ireland’s Paris Agreement commitments [7]. Most notably, the EPA have not found the Teagasc MACC
methane mitigation projections credible, and data shows voluntary uptake is far below what would
be required, especially given continued high dairy cattle numbers.
Teagasc principals state that methane “is a difficult gas to reduce without decreasing food production”
[8], but this claim is unfounded in our view because increased tillage and horticulture production on
suitable land currently used for cattle could easily produce more food with far less methane
production. Measures are urgently needed to support tillage and horticulture (especially to insure
against weather impacts) and reduced subsidies and supports for high emissions livestock production.
Research based on Ireland’s GHG targets for 2030 and animal per head emissions finds that animal
number reductions for all animal types will be required to meet Ireland’s national and EU targets with
any certainty [9]. The EU milk quota, in place until 2015, has been the only measure with proven
effectiveness to limit agricultural methane and nitrogen pollution, whereas policy based on Teagasc
MACC measures allowed a rapid increase in agricultural emissions and recent decreases are likely in
large part due to weather/climate impacts, higher feed and fertiliser costs due to wars, and Nitrates
derogation uncertainty. Thus, the most effective policy to reduce livestock emissions is to
(re)introduce national milk and meat production quotas in line with methane and nitrogen (ammonia
and nitrates) pathways to targets, with the quotas allocated across watersheds according to soil,
water and air pollution thresholds.
Taking a Just Transition approach to these changes will be fundamental in order to secure livelihoods
for those working in agriculture. This should include direct financial aid, for example, to those farmers
transitioning out of dairying, reducing stock numbers, engaging in rewetting of land, etc. We would
also highlight the following recommendation from a National Economic and Social Council report [10]
regarding the importance of strong stakeholder engagement in an agricultural just transition:
“Undertake a deep and wide process of further engagement with stakeholders in a national dialogue
on agriculture and land-use transition in order to build a greater sense of shared direction for
transition in the agriculture and land-use system. This dialogue should be participatory, clearly
communicate the scale of the change needed, and explore with a wide range of stakeholders,
particularly those most impacted, how to achieve transition in a fair and equitable manner.”
Furthermore, much greater focus is needed on food security. Ireland imports approximately 80% of
its food supply, leaving the country in a very precarious position in light of the impacts on global food
supplies resulting from climate change and geopolitical volatility. Given the scale of the change
needed to increase our food security and make food production climate and nature-compatible, we
recommend that a Department of Food Security be created [11] (or that the Department of
Agriculture’s remit be explicitly focused on food security and agricultural diversification to support
that).
The full enactment of the Climate Act is not possible until the Land Use, Land Use Change and Forestry
(LULUCF) sector is incorporated in the sectoral emission ceilings (SECs). It would not be acceptable
for this delay in completion of the budgets to extend further. It is accepted that the volatility of
LULUCF emissions makes for difficulties in setting a percentage reduction target along similar lines to
other sectors. However, the absence of a SEC for one sector raises questions about the finality of the
SECs for all other sectors, since the total carbon budget is set and the individual SECs must aggregate
to these totals.
The CCAC’s Review of the LULUCF Sector (2025) indicates the emissions trajectory required for the
sector to meet the target set under the LULUCF Regulation, which would entail a SEC of 18 MtCO2eq
for the Carbon Budget 2 Period 2026-2030. The EPA projects that the sector is unlikely to remain
within this emissions budget, exacerbated by the anticipated transition of forestry from being a net
carbon sink to a net source of emissions: “Total emissions from the LULUCF sector are projected to
increase over the period 2018 to 2030 by between 1.5 and 3.8 Mt CO2eq (an increase of 39 to 95
per cent). It is unlikely with current planned measures that the target set under the EU LULUCF
Regulation, and included in Climate Action Plan 2024, will be met” [12].
Urgent measures are needed across the land use sector to ensure that emissions increase projections
are tackled. This requires initiatives and supports for peatland and drained organic soil rewetting,
which are required under the Nature Restoration Law and need State leadership to implement.
According to the Irish Fiscal Advisory Council, LULUCF is estimated to account for €1.6 to €5.8 billion
of the financial burden incurred by remaining non-compliant with GHG emissions reduction targets.
The EPA 2026 Projections indicate a major mitigation failure is likely in the LULUCF sector due to
rapidly rising forestry emissions from now until 2035. The major cause of this failure is excess harvest
compared to past planting, and this failure is being worsened by storm damage. The Government’s
afforestation target of 8,000 ha/year is being missed by a huge margin, necessitating urgent action
to increase participation in the Forestry Programme 2023-2027 and to bring forward learning for the
next iteration of the Forestry Programme post-2027. Increasing afforestation is also urgent given the
slow rate at which carbon sequestration accumulates within newly established forests. An enhanced
focus on structural/species diversity and permanence of forest stands is essential to embed resilience
into the forest estate, which is currently being subjected to more clearfelling than is being afforested.
This has serious implications for emissions release from this sector and compromises adherence to
the LULUCF Regulation. A much greater emphasis on Continuous Cover Forestry (CCF) and close-tonature silviculture approaches is required which must be steered by the Government in a clear vision
and communication of available schemes. The Irish forestry model is in urgent need of a reset toward
far better climate and biodiversity outcomes, especially given that will soon become a carbon source
rather than sink. This requires a move away from monoculture dominance.
*Notes (see downloadable document)
QUESTION 4: In addition to the priority areas you have already identified in previous
questions, which other areas should this update to the Climate Action Plan focus on?
Fossil Fuel Subsidies
A policy priority that the CAP update should address is the removal of greenhouse gas subsidies.
These have been identified as costing the taxpayer €7 billion per annum. This is approximately three
times the cost of the new Children’s Hospital.
The Central Statistics Office (CSO) [1] estimated that fossil fuel subsidies were in an upward trajectory
between 2021-2023; being €4.978 billion in 2023, up 4.9% from 4.744 billion in 2022 , and up 74.2%
from the 2021 figure. In 2024, they declined slightly by 6% and were €4.67 billion. It is incompatible
with the objectives of any Climate Action Plan and the National Climate Objective that these persist
and undermine emission savings elsewhere. It appears that only provisional steps towards identifying,
tracking and reporting on these are currently being undertaken. However, despite undertakings
signed at COP27 and COP28, as well as Ireland’s commitment to co-host the 2027 Conference on
Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels, it appears that the Government has not made any commitment
or set a date or timeline for the phase out fossil fuel subsidies. Indeed, both CAP24 and CAP25 failed
to specify a clear commitment to rapidly phase out and eliminate fossil fuel subsidies, which requires
rectification in CAP26 in the context of worsening climate breakdown.
A first step in this regard should be to tax private jet landings in Ireland. Over 6,000 landings occur
annually. CAP26 should propose taxation along the lines of that required in France i.e. €400-1,000
per landing. Furthermore, we would highlight from CSO findings [2] that €0.72 billion of taxation
revenue was lost in 2024 as a result of an excise exemption for jet kerosene which is a missed
opportunity for redistribution of revenues from high-emitting sectors for decarbonisation and wider
societal goals.
Education and Empowerment
The updated Climate Action Plan should place greater emphasis on the enabling conditions for
successful delivery, particularly supported behaviour change and community-led action.
Infrastructure, regulation and incentives need to be complemented by sustained programmes that
support people and communities to adopt and maintain new behaviours. Educational institutions have
broad societal reach and potential for catalysis transformative change. Environmental education
programmes in schools and communities offer a practical and scalable way to support this change,
build participation and local ownership, and generate evidence on what works. This should include
understanding and addressing barriers to participation for different groups; for example, only 1 in
131 teenage girls cycled to school compared with 1 in 17 boys in the 2022 Census.
*Notes (see downloadable document)
QUESTION 5: The Joint Oireachtas Committee on Climate, Environment and Energy
published a Report on Barriers to Achieving Climate Targets (2026-30) in February. Do
you agree with the findings of this Report? What other barriers to achieving the climate
targets, if any, would you identify? How best can the identified barriers be addressed?
The Joint Oireachtas Committee report does identify many relevant and significant barriers to
achieving our climate targets (though we would emphasise that they are not targets, they are legal
obligations). However, the report fails to identify or interrogate the fact that barriers arise essentially
because of lack of political will and leadership from the Government to deliver the transformative
change needed. Indeed, this is an enormous barrier in and of itself.
The current Government is consistently rolling back climate commitments and has not demonstrated
anywhere near the level of ambition required to comply with our national, European and international
emissions reduction obligations. This Government also appears to be also pursuing a deregulatory
“simplification” agenda similar to that seen at EU level. Furthermore, recent narratives from
Government framing NGOs and environmental defenders as impediments to infrastructure delivery
also represent a deeply concerning and retrograde step.
As a crucial example of the lack of climate leadership we need, we would highlight that the
Government has introduced three pieces of legislation since the start of 2026 that disapply, or
automatically deem compliance with, the Climate Action and Low Carbon Development Act 2015 (as
amended) or parts of it, notably section 15 which places obligations on public bodies to perform their
functions in a manner consistent with the national climate objective, the objective of emissions
reduction, the CAPs, etc. The entirely unevidenced disapplication of or deemed compliance with
climate obligations in the various bills from this Government is setting an alarming precedent for
relinquishing climate action and planning controls to facilitate emissions-intensive facilities while we
face a worsening climate emergency and all of the impacts this will have on our communities and
environment. It also raises legal concerns regarding proportionality and justification. Legislative
disapplication of a statutory duty, particularly one forming a core part of the State’s climate
governance framework, should only be justified where there is clear evidence of a substantive conflict.
No evidence has been presented in these cases.
Ultimately, disapplying Climate Act provisions risks undermining the rule of law. It also sets a
dangerous precedent that the Government may seek to exclude obligations where they are
considered inconvenient for a particular industry.
Yet while it seriously rolls back climate action domestically, the Government is simultaneously touting
its climate credentials on the international stage, for example, as Ireland has agreed to co-host the
second annual global conference on Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels next year. This disconnect
between the way in which the Irish government is presenting itself on the global stage and its lack
of serious climate ambition at home risks serious reputational damage to the government and to the
country, particularly during the Irish EU Council Presidency (which lacks any substantive climate
focus) and as Ireland plays a leading role in international climate negotiations during COP at the end
of this year.
Please see our response to Question 1 for more on the lack of political will.
We also note the following additional barriers not discussed in the Joint Oireachtas Committee Report:
• Climate obstruction from multinational corporations who lobby to block and delay climate
policy. The Irish government’s catering to multinational corporations seems to have
deprioritised the focus and ambition on climate action.
• Limited mechanisms for translating valuable school-level evidence into local authority
infrastructure planning and investment. Walkability and Cycleability Audits, speed surveys and
other school travel data provide detailed evidence on local barriers, with examples in 2025 of
this informing infrastructure improvements. A formal process for local authorities to receive,
consider and respond to this evidence within a defined timeframe would help ensure it
consistently informs investment and action.
The Barriers report findings and recommendations also omit mention of the crucial importance of
avoiding societal inequality barriers to meeting climate targets. A detailed and effective National Social
Climate Plan is essential to ensure fairness and targeted measures to avoid societal barriers, including
a ‘green divide’ between more and less affluent households, to achieve climate targets.
Finally, the list of Stakeholders engaged in the preparation of this report indicates that the Committee
primarily engaged with industry representative bodies, but largely failed to engage with expert
academics and eNGOs that work in the relevant areas.
QUESTION 6: The principles of a Just Transition (evidence-base and structured; skills and
opportunity; fair sharing of costs; social dialogue and lived experience) are explained by
the Just Transition Commission. What are your views on how these principles can be
incorporated into the next CAP or climate action more generally?
As mentioned throughout Questions 1-6, a new transformative approach prioritising public investment
vulnerable and marginalised sections of society is urgently needed in CAP26.
Social progress and climate action are interlinked. Climate governance should be underpinned by
evidence-based decision-making, clear ambition, prioritisation of the vulnerable and marginalised,
meaningful public participation, and clear accountability. All climate action/policy aspects must reflect
Just Transition (JT) principles, not treat it separately. This requires focus on equitable distribution
across areas such as housing, transport, agriculture, land use, energy, enterprise, skills and
adaptation.
Workers associated with high-emitting sectors must be prioritised for clean sector transition, including
retraining, across rural, agricultural, marine, and disadvantaged urban communities at risk of being
left behind. Employment in nature restoration projects will also require upscaling to implement the
national Nature Restoration Plan. The Midlands peatland restoration projects offer lessons for projects
in housing retrofit, transport investment, energy supports, agri-environment schemes, renewable
energy and forest diversification.
Subsequent CAPs must now demonstrate JT commitments which are delivered on the ground and in
design, delivery and evaluation of climate policy. This has been missing thus far, aside from
aspirational rhetoric, making it unclear if climate action is actually delivering fair outcomes for those
affected by the transition. The Government must now act decisively due to inequitable climate impacts
in employment, age, gender, socioeconomic status and mobility. For example, current fossil fuel price
volatilities are deepening economic precarity, and renters/lower income households struggle to access
retrofitting grants. Targeted measures are required to ensure that equity and fairness are achieved.
The Climate Act requires Government to respect JT principles of maximising employment and
supporting communities negatively impacted by the climate transition. The development of a National
JT Strategy will set a longer-term framework, but needs sufficient resources with a clear accountability
mechanism for failures.
Transport provides a strong example for how the next CAP should embed JT principles in transport
policy by prioritising measures that address unequal access to sustainable travel:
• Make sustainable travel affordable: Prioritise affordable or free school transport,
particularly in rural areas where limited alternatives can make car dependency structural
rather than a choice.
• Target investment where barriers are greatest: Prioritise safe walking and cycling
infrastructure, lower speed limits and traffic calming in disadvantaged areas, including around
DEIS schools.
• Support participation and lived experience: Invest in targeted programmes that address
barriers to active travel, such as #AndSheCycles, and strengthen mechanisms for students
and communities to inform local transport decisions through Walkability Audits, Travel Forums
and engagement with local authorities.
The JT Commission has also highlighted the following challenges: limited integration of JT across
Government, an underdeveloped socio-economic evidence base, and the absence of
indicators/targets allowing for assessment of climate policy’s delivery of fair and equitable outcomes.
Tools such as the Wellbeing Framework and indicators relating to poverty, unemployment, energy
poverty, etc. could be leveraged more in policy design and evaluation.
Furthermore, the Irish Government has yet to utilise the EU Social Climate Fund and produce a Social
Climate Plan to assist vulnerable households and tackle energy poverty. This failure, in the context
of geopolitical instability, energy price volatility etc., is unacceptable and requires immediate
prioritisation. Resilience, fairness and structural transition must be to the forefront of a long-term
strategic approach to tackling energy poverty.
Strengthening of public participation in shaping climate policies would allow for a meaningful JT. The
current written consultation model is largely tokenistic/adversarial. Transparency regarding how
public views have shaped policy is also lacking. A shift allowing people to access and engage with
information, and actively shape and feed back into it would benefit climate policy. The current online
questionnaire format needs to maximise community engagement and not be a foregone conclusion.
The National Dialogue on Climate Action could streamline public viewpoints into future CAPs, as well
as sector-specific dialogues.
QUESTION 7: The National Adaptation Framework and the Sectoral Adaptation Plans
have been published. To what extent should further climate change adaptation measures
be included in the next CAP?
The inclusion of adaptation measures in CAP26 should not be at the expense of mitigation
implementation, which should constitute the core of the plan, however, the National and Sectoral
Adaptation Plans require significant attention, and climate adaptation does need to be central to
CAP26.
Climate impacts are already having devastating impacts on some communities, but supports are
inconsistent and inadequate. Households and communities that are already marginalised are most
vulnerable, so this is why CAP26 must prioritise investments for those who have been and continue
to be left behind. Climate disruptions including heat, floods, fires and drought are worsening every
year and Ireland is completely unprepared. The impacts are not being experienced uniformly across
society - huge new investments are urgently needed.
Following the publication of Sectoral Adaptation Plans (SAPs) in November 2025 there is now a need
to prioritise the actions from each of the SAPs that will have a substantial impact in strengthening
adaptive capacity and climate resilience. Nature-based solutions that will have significant multiple
benefits such as for flood prevention, carbon storage, improved water quality and biodiversity, should
be included in the list of priorities. Given the lack of implementation of the Biodiversity SAP (2019–
2025) as per the findings of the Climate Change Advisory Council 2025 Adaptation Scorecard there is
also a need to include priority actions in Climate Action Plan 2026 that will address these failings.
The Climate Action Plan 2026 should include an objective to the effect that the Department of
Housing, Local Government and Heritage will publish a full Built Environment and Planning SAP as
opposed to the current proposal to undertake a departmental scoping exercise. In addition, a
commitment to publish a fully operational National Coastal Change Management Plan including
relocation schemes for priority vulnerable areas should be in included in Climate Action Plan 2026.
The resilience of infrastructure supporting sustainable travel must also be central to the adaptation
approach. School feedback highlights weather variability as a factor influencing active travel uptake.
Infrastructure should therefore be designed to remain safe, accessible and attractive under changing
climate conditions, including increased rainfall, flooding and extreme weather.